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A methodological flaw in ‘The neural basis of
flashback formation: the impact of viewing trauma’
Discussions of post-traumatic stress have often
emphasized the disordered ways in which intrusively
remembered episodes are interpreted, recollected and
re-experienced, during the months after those episodes
take place. Relatively little emphasis has been placed
on the way in which such episodes are processed at
the time of their initial occurrence. This is reflected in
our diagnostic practice, and in our psychological theor-
izing. An important series of recent papers (Bourne et al.
2013; Clark et al. 2014, 2016) suggests that this is a mis-
take. These papers establish that intrusively remem-
bered episodes are processed in a distinctive way at
the time when they are first experienced. They thereby
raise the question of how the initial processing of intru-
sively remembered episodes differs from the initial
processing of normally remembered episodes. That
question has received less attention than it deserves.
One possible hypothesis is that the difference in ques-
tion is a difference of emotional intensity. According to
this view intrusively remembered episodes differ from
other episodes just because the emotional responses
that they elicit, at the time when they are first experi-
enced, are extreme. An alternative view says that it is
not mere extremity, but is instead extreme negativity,
that distinguishes intrusively remembered experiences
from normally remembered ones. Further hypotheses
could be generated by the adding of further precisifica-
tions: Perhaps the episodes that are prone to being intru-
sively remembered are characterized by extremes of
outwardly directed negativity; perhaps by extremes of
fear, of helplessness, of dissociation from the self, of
threat to life, or of threat to status. Each of these is, on
the face of it, a plausible hypothesis.
In contrast to this broad family of emotion-based hy-
potheses, there is an equally broad family of hypoth-
eses that take the initial processing of intrusively
remembered episodes to be marked, not only by emo-
tion, but also by some more purely cognitive peculiar-
ity. One such hypothesis says that the initial
processing of intrusively remembered episodes is
marked by a brief shift towards a more schizotypal
style of cognition (Steel & Holmes, 2007). As before,
more or less specific hypotheses might be generated
that belong to this broadly cognitive family.
Bourne et al. suggest that the evidence given in their
2013 study favours hypotheses of this second type.
They write that ‘although intense emotional reaction
may be a necessary condition for flashback formation
it appears not to be sufficient’ (p. 1529). The grounds
on which they make this claim are flawed.
Bourne et al. (2013) used functional magnetic reson-
ance imaging (fMRI) data from participants who were
watching traumatic scenes, in order to compare the
haemodynamic response to those scenes that did ap-
pear in the participants’ subsequent flashbacks – (as
gauged from their diary entries over the following
week) –with the response to those scenes that did
not appear in such flashbacks, but that did have the
potential to do so (as indicated by the fact that they
appeared in the diaries of other participants). In
order to control for the ‘subjective emotional experi-
ence of the flashback and potential scenes’ (p. 1525),
participants were given a written description of each
of the 20 scenes that they had been shown, a week
after having been shown them. They gave subjective
ratings of ‘how distressed and emotional they found
each of them’, on a 10-point scale (Bourne et al. 2013,
Supplementary materials). These retrospective ratings
were then used as covariates in the analysis of the
fMRI data. The authors report that: ‘The same pattern
of results was found with [these] covariates (with
slightly reduced spatial extent) as was initially found.
Therefore these [emotional] variables are unlikely to
explain the activation pattern associated with flash-
back encoding’ (p. 1526).
Theflaw in this last piece of reasoning is one that often
arises when coarse-grained and fine-grained data are
mixed together in a causal inference. It is hard to avoid
when introspection and fMRI are used in combination.
The problem originates in a violation of what is some-
times called the ‘faithfulness’ constraint (Spirtes et al.
1993)1†. It can be illustrated with a simple analogy.
Suppose one has some fine-grained measurements
of rainfall, and also some coarse-grained measure-
ments of weather. (The latter measurements might be
based on judgments that were made a week after the
day in question, on the basis of recollection, on a
10-point scale.) Suppose that one finds a relationship
between these fine-grained rainfall measurements
and the subsequent growth of one’s lawn, during the
following week. This statistical relationship is likely
to remain, in only somewhat diminished form, if one
† The note appears after the main text.
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adds the coarse-grained assessment of weather as a
covariate in one’s analysis. That is simply because rain-
fall will correlate with lawn growth within the broad
class of somewhat showery days, just as it will within
the broad class of rather rainy days. It would be a mis-
take to take the persistence of rainfall’s effect, after
coarse-grained weather measurements have been fac-
tored in, as being evidence that the relationship be-
tween rainfall and one’s lawn is not mediated by – or
identical to – an effect of weather.
Similarly, if one has a fine-grained measurement of
the activation in certain brain areas during flashback-
provoking episodes, and if one also has a coarse-
grained measurement of the emotion that was experi-
enced during these episodes, one should expect that
the pattern of covariation between brain activations
and flashbacks will persist, in only somewhat dimin-
ished form, after the contribution of coarse-grained
emotion has been taken into account. Such persistence
is no indication that the observed relation between
brain states and flashbacks was not mediated by – or
identical to – an effect of emotion.
Bourne et al. (2013) do remark upon a related meth-
odological difficulty, but the difficulty that they note is
not the crucial one. They acknowledge that their meas-
ure of emotion ‘was retrospective and may have been
contaminated by the presence of intrusive recollections
for the Flashback events in the intervening week’
(Bourne et al. 2013, Supplementary materials). They
take this difficulty to be mitigated by the thought
that ‘any contamination effect would likely have
increased the retrospective rating of the emotionality
of intruding scenes thereby reducing the contrast effect
once emotionality was co-varied’. This addresses a dif-
ferent difficulty from the one that is outlined above.
The difficulty above originates, not from the time at
which emotional responses were reported, nor from
the possibility that those responses might be ‘contami-
nated’, but from the fineness of grain with which such
responses can be measured. It reflects the inherent lim-
itations of affective introspection (Haybron, 2007), and
is therefore difficult to avoid.
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1 The term ‘faithfulness constraint’ belongs to the literature
on causal modelling, where it is explicated with reference
to the mathematical apparatus of directed acyclic graphs.
The motivation for it can be understood informally as
being the idea that B mediates the causal interaction be-
tween A and C only if there is no further information to
be had from A about C’s occurrence, once the information
from B has been taken into account.
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